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INTRODUCTION
Pharmaceutical prices have been a prominent political issue over the past two decades, surfacing everywhere from the Catastrophic Health Insurance Bill to proposals for Medicare coverage of drugs. Legislative efforts to curb drug prices have been implemented on a small scale, and, during health care reform discussions, debated but not implemented on a much larger scale.
Our purpose is to look for effects of legal changes and political climates on pharmaceutical prices during much of this period. Using two different data sets, we find little, if any, effect of legal changes or other events on prices. We do find evidence of self-regulation by the pharmaceutical companies during the early years of the Clinton Administration, suggesting they preemptively lowered prices or price increases under the threat of regulation. Specifically, by comparing pricing strategies across firms which differ in their vulnerability to price regulation, we find evidence that more vulnerable firms slowed their price increases during the period in which regulation seemed most likely.
Economic models deal extensively with firms' responses to the legal environment in which they operate (i.e. past government actions) as well as their customers ' and competitors' actions. This paper addresses the hypothesis that firms' decisions are also affected by pressure from the general public and policy makers, in other words, by the threat of future government action.
Economists have proposed several theories to explain government involvement in firms' decisions. Public interest theories of industrial policy predict that the government will intervene to correct market failures. If government intervention is costly, however, the role the government plays in solving different market failures may vary based on the costs of intervention (or "political transaction costs"). In other words, in circumstances where the costs of government intervention are high and the costs of private action are low, there is room for private exchange (see Noll, 1989 and the references he cites).
Whether government regulation of drug prices would have solved a market failure is a complicated, controversial question on which this paper remains agnostic. Other theories of government regulation do not start from the premise that the government is solving market failures, but rather emphasize the roles that competing interest groups play in convincing policy makers to allocate rents to their members (Stigler, 1971) . Within this paradigm, however, competing interest groups may still privately decide to enact changes to redistribute rents instead of leaving decisions to policy makers. They will do so if the private steps are much less expensive than potential policy changes. For instance, the drug companies may have lowered vaccine prices slightly in 1993 in order to diffuse the strength with which children's rights activists opposed high prices if doing so avoided costly government intervention. Private responses are likely if they sufficiently diffuse the poignancy of the competing interest group's issue. One could even imagine a type of political "contestability," where the persistent threat of government intervention constantly distorts firm behavior. This paper seeks to provide an empirical example of a case in which firms perceived that taking costly steps on their own was preferable to likely government intervention. Little empirical evidence of such actions yet exists. A related paper by Erfle and McMillan (1990) considers oil prices during the price shocks in the late 1970's, comparing prices charged by large, domestic oil producers to prices of small and foreign companies. They hypothesize that the big, domestic firms are better able to influence government and public perceptions about policy.
They show that the large, domestic producers were more likely to adjust their prices for home heating oil relative to the prices for oil sold to electric utilities when evening television programs were providing heavy coverage of the oil price shock. Pricing during less politically sensitive times was more homogenous. Both Erfle and McMillan (1990) and our paper identify politically motivated pricing by comparing decisions across firms, although the approaches are complementary. While they segment firms as being more and less able to influence the government, this paper compares pricing by firms more and less willing to sacrifice current profits to avert future regulation.
1,2 Olmstead and Rhode (1985) describe a situation where oil companies appeared to lower prices in the summer of 1920 in the face of potential government involvement, but conclude that the hypothesis is "nearly impossible to test" (p. 1050). In more recent work, Stango (2000) reports that bigger, more politically visible, credit card issuers were more likely to lower interest rates following threatened legislation to cap rates. He also shows that announced rate reductions led to positive stock price responses for both the announcing firm and its competitors.
The literature on firms' environmental activities also has examples of private responses to threatened regulation. 3 For example, Pargal and Wheeler (1996) showed that Indonesian plants were less likely to pollute in areas where the local townspeople were more likely to impose high costs on polluters (for instance, they cite examples where local farmers burned a factory that was polluting irrigation channels). They describe such public reactions as a system of informal regulation that develops when formal government regulation is non-existent or poorly enforced.
Our paper is similar to Pargal and Wheeler's though it considers a different sort of firm response (slower price increases as opposed to pollution abatement) and considers private actions in a country with an extensive regulatory and legislative apparatus through which competing interest groups mediate conflict.
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Our results also speak indirectly to the nature of corporations' political power by providing a new piece of evidence on the way in which firms can set the political agenda.
Previous empirical work has considered the impact of corporate lobbying and campaign contributions on political decisions. Studies have both sought patterns in campaign contributions (e.g. across industries) and also considered the relationship between campaign contributions and votes in Congress. 5 By considering whether firms make decisions in response to the threat of policies, our results address the extent to which firms can keep issues from coming to vote in the 3 Examples include Kennedy, Laplante and Maxwell (1994) , Konar and Cohen (1997) and Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000) . first place. 6 That would imply that by only considering actual votes, previous studies might have yielded biased assessments of corporations' impact on political outcomes.
For the core of our paper-the analysis of self-regulating behavior during the period of greatest threat of regulation-we construct three measures which reflect cross-sectional differences in firm political sensitivity or vulnerability: recent past corporate contributions to political action committees, percentage of sales of drugs purchased disproportionately by the elderly, and number of on-patent drug-years ahead of each firm. We analyze whether these measures are associated with slower price growth during the early 1990s. We perform this analysis twice, using a data set containing average wholesale prices of 106 of the largest revenue prescription drugs sold in the U.S. during the period, as well as a set containing wholesale transactions prices of antibiotics. Despite the very different characteristics and origins of the data sets, our results are broadly consistent. Although the magnitudes of the effects we find are small, our measures of political sensitivity are correlated with slower price growth in both data sets.
In addition to our focus on firm behavior during the early 1990's, when major health care reform seemed likely, we take a broader view and present descriptive evidence on trends in pharmaceutical pricing over an eleven year period from 1985 to 1996. We find mostly patterns of small steady increases or decreases over this period with little evidence of the effects of political events on pricing. In fact, this event study of prices shows an effect only of health care reform debates.
Pharmaceutical prices have attracted considerable research interest, in addition to the attention they have received in public forums and the press. For instance, the systematic new product introductions (both generic and new branded) provide interesting test cases for theories of market dynamics (see e.g., Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz, 1991, and Ellison and Ellison, 1999) and price indices (see e.g., Griliches and Cockburn, 1994) . The industry is also heavily regulated along several dimensions, and a number of existing studies evaluate the effects changes in specific regulations have had on drug pricing (see e.g., Masson and Steiner, 1985 , Grabowski and Vernon, 1992 and Scott Morton, 1997 . Those studies consider enacted legislation and address neither the genesis of the regulatory changes nor the effects drug companies' actions may have had on the legislative outcome.
This paper proceeds by providing a chronology culled from the contemporary press of events, perceptions, and debates relevant to pharmaceutical pricing since the mid-1980s. Section 3 describes the pricing data we use. Section 4 presents overall time series patterns in pharmaceutical pricing, and considers evidence of changes in price trends around the events identified by the chronology in Section 2. Section 5 considers the period of debate of health care reform in more detail, and presents cross-sectional evidence, based on firm differences in political sensitivity, of the effects of those debates. Section 6 concludes.
CHRONOLOGY
The time period we consider begins in October 1985, a year after the Drug Price
Competition and Patent-term Restoration Act of 1984 (commonly referred to as the WaxmanHatch Act) was passed. This lifted substantial barriers to generic entry into many therapeutic categories. 7 The mid to late 1980's brought various congressional proposals to expand Medicare coverage to include prescription drugs (The Washington Post, 1987b , 1988 , as well as public scrutiny of prescription drug prices (The Washington Post, 1987a) . Starting in July of 1988, however, public scrutiny shifted as a scandal involving several manufacturers of generic drugs broke (The Washington Post, 1989) . The scandal involved allegations of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) favoritism in granting approval of generic drugs. It resulted in fines and jail sentences for some FDA officials, as well as the tabling of any congressional proposals involving mandated generic substitution. In fact it was reported that "as the current crisis continues to hold the public spotlight, many health officials fear that one of the most effective ways to hold down medical costs for the consumer may now be in serious jeopardy (The Washington Post, 1989) ."
7 Note that provisions similar to those in Waxman-Hatch had already been in place for antibiotics for decades (see Hellerstein (1995) ), one reason why generic entry into antibiotics had historically been so substantial. Times, 1990 , The Washington Post, 1990 .
There was some speculation in the industry that such a provision would cause firms to eliminate deep discounts given to some wholesale customers (such as hospitals and HMOs).
Such action would have two effects, decreasing wholesale price dispersion and also raising the average wholesale price.
Best-price is working brilliantly for its proponents. By forcing drugmakers to extend discounts to Medicaid for no additional business, it makes price cutting far more expensive. The manufacturers' response is simple: On many drugs, no buyer gets a discount deeper than Medicaid's 15.7%. The losers are the most powerful buyers like HMOs and hospitals, which frequently received discounts of 40%, 50%, or more (Fortune, 1993b) . As part of a plan to transform the cost and delivery of health care, the Clinton Administration has launched a scalding attack on drugmakers, fanning public outrage over their high prices. The presidential task force, headed by Hillary Rodham Clinton, has threatened to shackle the industry with price controls and other onerous regulations (Fortune, 1993a) .
The prospects of the industry are reflected in a huge decrease, over 40% by one measure 10 , in the market-adjusted value of a portfolio of pharmaceutical stocks over the year during which the health care reform plan was being formulated. The most precipitous decline occurs in the spring months, after leaks about price controls.
In March of 1993 several pharmaceutical companies announced voluntary price restraint, essentially keeping price increases at the rate of inflation (The San Francisco Chronicle, 1993) .
The Task Force disbanded at the end of May, and in September of 1993, the President's Health Security Plan was first leaked and then officially unveiled before Congress. The plan did not include price controls for pharmaceuticals. Instead it proposed to control costs of pharmaceuticals by giving the purchasers more "buying clout."
Under reform, with the addition of prescription drug coverage, Medicare will become the world's largest purchaser of drugs. And the Medicare program will use its negotiating power to get discounts from the pharmaceutical companies. In addition, with competing health plans trying to become more efficient, more and more buyers will use the same successful negotiating techniques (The President's Health Security Plan, 1993) .
October of 1993 marked the high point for the political prospects of health care reform (Johnson and Broder (1996) ). The demise of the Clinton Plan was gradual, beginning soon after its official unveiling, continuing with announcements of various business and consumer interest groups that they would oppose it, 11 and culminating with the official tabling of the legislation in September of 1994.
From the fall of 1992 through the fall of 1994, Congress was occupied first with the election and then with hearings on health care reform. Not surprisingly, there were no substantial legal changes enacted at the federal level involving pharmaceuticals during this period. 
PRICING DATA
For our analyses we use two main pricing data sets. One is a set of 106 of the largest revenue prescription drugs sold in the U.S. during this period. These drugs span many different therapeutic classes and were all produced by "branded" manufacturers, those engaging in efforts to discover, patent, and sell novel pharmaceutical products. These are also the manufacturers receiving the most political scrutiny and pressure during health care reform discussions. These data contain monthly prices from 1989 to 1996, but do not contain information on sales or revenues. The second is a set of (virtually) all prescription antibiotics sold in the U.S. from 1990 to 1996 and one large subclass of antibiotics from 1985 to 1990. These data have the obvious drawback of only covering one therapeutic class, but they do contain revenue information as well as information on sales by "generic" manufacturers and sales of other small revenue drugs. The other main difference between the two data sets is that the former contains Average Wholesale Prices (AWP), as reported by the manufacturers, and the latter contains averaged transactions prices, as collected from both manufacturer and wholesale purchaser by IMS, a market research firm. More detail on the structure and sources of these data sets is included in the appendix.
11 For example, The Business Roundtable announced opposition to the plan in February.
12 Ellison and Mullin (2001) provide a more complete argument that the health care reform debates were by far the most important event affecting pharmaceutical companies during this period.
Note that both of these data sets contain measures of wholesale prices, arguably the level of most interest in this market. Much of the public debate, centering on the actions of the drug manufacturers, is focused on the wholesale level. Government policies regarding drug reimbursement also are concerned with wholesale prices.
Our use of two separate data sets is an important feature of our study. Previous studies using AWP have been questioned because AWP tends to significantly overstate transactions prices, a more reliable measure of actual firm behavior. 13 The reliability of IMS transactions prices has also been questioned because they do not reflect rebates given by the manufacturer.
While we cannot construct a perfect data set, we do have the unusual advantage that we can carry out our analyses twice, once on each data set. In fact, we find that our general results are robust to our choice of data set, bolstering confidence in our interpretations.
Our pricing data are summarized in Table 1 , which presents average price growth rates,
Price Change = ((p t -p t-1 )/p t-1 ).
For the top 106 data set, p is AWP for month t. We have monthly data on prices for 925 National Drug Codes (NDCs) for 106 top-selling drugs. 14 The price series begin in January 1989, so the first price change is in February 1989. The data continue through December 1996. For the antibiotics data set, p is aggregated transactions prices at the drug level for month t. This data set is separated into four categories. First, data on cephalosporins, a subclass of antibiotics based on its mechanism of action, is presented for months November 1985 to August 1996. 15 Cephalosporins are further separated into those produced by branded manufacturers and those produced by generic manufacturers. 16 Then for 13 It could be argued that AWP may, in fact, be the measure we are most interested in because it is reported and published and so tends to receive a lot of public scrutiny. Also, since most of our analysis uses price changes rather than price levels, changes in AWP may be reflective of changes in transactions prices, even if the levels are systematically too high.
14 NDCs provide unique identifiers for every strength, dosage form, and package size of every drug. 15 Cephalosporins, constituting approximately 40% of antibiotic sales during this period, is the only subclass for which we have data back to 1985. We will, therefore, use cephalosporin data to examine time series evidence over a longer period. Section 5, which examines cross-sectional evidence of political pressure focusing on health care reform discussions of the early 1990's, will exploit a fuller set of antibiotics, all of those products made by branded manufacturers. 16 We defined a branded manufacturer as one that has engaged in R&D effort and introduced at least one novel, patented pharmaceutical product, even though they may also produce "generic" versions of some drugs. The summary statistics in the period October 1990 to August 1996, we present summary statistics for all antibiotics, again separated by branded and generic manufacturers.
For the top 106 drugs the average monthly growth rate was .4% per month, though the standard deviation suggests there was significant variation over time and across NDCs. Both average growth rates and standard deviations are much smaller for the antibiotics data sets.
These facts are not unexpected given the density in product space of antibiotics relative to other classes of drugs (thus making price increases more difficult) and the relative homogeneity of products within a class relative to across classes. Note, also, that the (branded) antibiotics are, on average, older than the top 106 drugs, with a much larger average time since patent expiration (and smaller average time before). We also computed the between firm standard deviation of prices by year to examine how variations in pricing strategies have evolved over time. We found that 1993 was the year with the lowest standard deviation, consistent with firms entering into price pledges in response to the threat of potential regulation.
OVERALL TRENDS
We first examine broad time series patterns in pharmaceutical company pricing and research and development spending decisions to look for effects of the various events mentioned in the chronology. Figure 1 plots an eleven-year monthly price index of all cephalosporins.
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This aggregate index exhibits a modest average annual growth rate (AAGR) of 1.1%, as well as consistency through the political vicissitudes of the past eleven years. The only notable deviation from a broad linear trend occurs over the most recent few years. As public concern over rising drug prices waxes and wanes, cephalosporin prices, at least, steer a fairly steady course of small price increases until approximately 1994, when prices level off and then drop.
18 Table 1 do not weight by revenue, explaining why the average price increase was higher for generic than for branded cephalosporins.
Consider the events in the chronology in more detail. The Medicaid best price provision, taking effect in January 1991, has no obvious impact on prices of cephalosporins, despite speculation in the popular press about how average wholesale prices will go up. (There is a runup in price in the four months leading up to January 1991 of about 2%, but this increase is not out of line with other fluctuations around the general trend.) 19 Examining pricing differences between branded and generic 20 manufacturers gives us
another lens through which to analyze events mentioned in the chronology. In particular, we would expect some of those events to have had differential impacts on branded and generic manufacturers. Figure 2 shows the branded-generic split. The generic index is rebased at approximately 50% of the branded index, reflecting that fact that existing generics in October of 1985 were pricing on average at half of the branded price for the corresponding chemical compound. The branded index exhibits price increases over the entire period, although at a slower rate starting around 1993. The generic index is falling over our entire period, with an increasing rate of price decline in recent years roughly paralleling the branded slow down.
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The first event of note is the generic drug scandal. If the scandal served to shift down demand for generic drugs, further differentiate branded and generic versions, temporarily relieve political pressure on branded manufacturers, or all three, we would expect a further widening of the branded-generic price difference during this period. We do, in fact, see a small but perceptible increase in the rate at which generics are decreasing prices around mid-1988. The branded index appears unaffected. Note, however, that cephalosporins had relatively little generic penetration at this time: generic sales were about a third of branded sales in mid-1988.
Health care reform might also have different impacts on branded and generic manufacturers. Political pressure was clearly focused on branded manufacturers, and it was the branded manufacturers who voluntarily restrained prices. 22 We do, however, see a slightly more marked price decrease among generic manufacturers than among branded manufacturers.
Generic antibiotics, however, have a slightly different regulatory history from generic drugs in other therapeutic classes and may not be representative of the class overall. For one, branded manufacturers produce a substantial fraction of generic antibiotics, unlike other therapeutic classes.
Figure 3 presents the last piece of graphical evidence of pharmaceutical price changes:
plots of annual changes in the CPI and PPI for pharmaceutical products, as well as the average annual price change across drugs in our top 106 data set. For comparison purposes, we also include the overall CPI. The slowdown in price growth in the early 1990's is much more pronounced than in the antibiotics plots, and it is instructive to consider why. First, it is well known that the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) over-samples older drugs and higher revenue drugs when constructing the CPI and PPI (see Griliches and Cockburn (1994) and Berndt, Griliches, and Rosett (1993) , for example). Since these drugs tend to have faster price growth, this typically leads to an upward bias in the official indexes. In our case, however, a pronounced slowdown in the official indexes, relative to the antibiotics index, suggests that the drugs oversampled by BLS, the older, higher revenue drugs, actually had slower price growth during this period. To the extent that the drugs over-sampled by the BLS tended to be more visible and high-profile, this observation is consistent with our notion that political sensitivity led to price moderation. 23 Second, we would expect the same pattern for the top 106 data set since it is composed entirely of high revenue drugs.
22 Such political pressure could have had an indirect effect on generic manufacturers through changes in the competitive environment, but one would expect those effects to be smaller than any direct effect. 23 The different pricing patterns we observe are not due to peculiarities in cephalosporin pricing. The cephalosporin PPI exhibits the same pronounced slowdown as the pharmaceutical PPI and CPI, in contrast to the more subtle slowdown in
To further investigate the possible effects of health care reform discussions, we consider one specific mechanism through which prices could have been moderated: voluntary price restraints. Table 2 summarizes price increases for all of the manufacturers in our data sets that had pledged to voluntarily restrain prices. 24 For the top 106 data set, we report the average price increase for each company, unweighted by sales across drugs, for the period 1990-1992 (roughly, the pre-pledge period) and 1993-1996 (roughly, the post-pledge period). All of the companies lowered their price increases precipitously during the post-pledge period, although many of the increases exceeded the inflation rate of 2.8%. 25 Notably, of the five companies for which we found no evidence that they had pledged to lower their prices, two of the companies (Amgen and Burroughs Wellcome) had higher price increases in the post-pledge period than in the pre-pledge period. While hardly a conclusive test, this could suggest that the lower price increases were not related to general trends that affected the whole industry and that the pledges restrained pricing.
For the antibiotic data set, we calculated average annual growth rates (AAGRs) of the price indexes for each firm. AAGRs for the pre-pledge period range from -14.2% to 7.5%, five exceeding the inflation rate of 4.0%. During the post-pledge period, only one firm exceeded the inflation rate and seven of the seventeen lowered antibiotic prices during that period. All but four of the firms had slower price growth (or sharper decline) in the post-pledge period.
Generally, the results in Table 2 suggest that firms abided by their pledges and decreased prices or lowered their rate of price increases in response to the threat of health care reform. To the extent that one firm's price reduction could defray the probability of regulation for all firms in the industry, unilateral price reductions may not have been successful. While the DOJ declared the industry's attempt to coordinate pledges illegal, the industry-wide push to have firms our broader cephalosporin index.
adhere to their pledges appeared at least somewhat successful in overcoming the collective action problem.
The last overall trend we consider is firm-level investment in research and development (R&D). Figure 4 plots the weighted-average ratio of R&D to sales for the 15 companies in our sample for which we could get both R&D and sales data for the entire eleven-year period from 1986-1996. 26 The graph demonstrates that the deceleration in R&D expenditure growth during health care reform exceeded the sales slowdown. This could suggest that the companies foresaw some chance that prices for new drugs would be regulated in the future, so they had less of an incentive to invest in drug development.
CROSS-SECTIONAL EVIDENCE
Time series evidence from the last section suggested a slowdown in price increases coincident with health care reform discussions. In particular, firms which entered into a politically-motivated pledge to keep price increases at the rate of inflation seemed to increase their prices at a slower rate (or decrease them) after entering into the pledge. Other explanations, such as the changing structure of the market for pharmaceuticals, for instance, cannot be ruled out based on the time series evidence alone. This section investigates the extent to which crosssectional differences in firms could provide additional evidence that they were reacting to political pressures during health care reform discussions. Ironically, the price pledge, which seemed important in detecting time series evidence, will complicate our search for crosssectional evidence, because such a collective action masks the differences in firms' incentives to act unilaterally.
Broadly speaking, our empirical strategy is to measure the political sensitivity of firms- 26 The R&D and sales data are from Compustat. Data for G.D. Searle and Sandoz were unavailable. Data for 6 companies were only available for part of the time period, and we exclude those companies from the figure so that year-to-year changes do not reflect compositional changes. When we include them, the dip in R&D/Sales growth in 1994 is more dramatic and the change in 1996 is positive even though none of the composition changes occur during either of those two years.
for instance based on how much they have to lose from enacted health care reform legislationand then evaluate whether increased sensitivity is associated with slower price increases. We first lay out our methods of measuring cross-sectional differences in firms' political sensitivity.
Measuring Political Sensitivity
To develop estimates of a company's sensitivity to the political climate, we appeal to Glazer and McMillan (1992) who propose a theoretical model of a monopolist facing future regulation. They demonstrate that the firm's incentives to reduce its prices in the face of potential regulation are a function of both the effect such an action has on the probability of regulation and the cost of sacrificing short run profits to avert regulation -the firm's discount Measure 1 is intended to proxy for the firm's discount factor, under the assumption that a firm with less time remaining on important patents would be less willing to take costly steps in the short run to preempt future regulation. Measure 2 captures the fact that firms with more drugs used by the elderly faced a higher probability of facing regulation in the near term since Medicare reimbursements would have provided a ready vehicle through which the government could affect 27 Baron (1997) develops a common agency model where two firms attempt to influence government decisions (in his case Kodak and Fujifilm are both trying to influence the Japanese and American governments). Though Baron's setting is somewhat different from Glazer and McMillan's (for instance, he has firms making direct expenditures to influence the government rather than using prices), the characterization of multiple firms taking actions to influence the government is appropriate to the pharmaceutical industry. A number of Baron's comparative static results are similar to those in Glazer and McMillan. For instance, he shows that a firm will spend more to influence the government if its payoff from doing so is higher.
drug prices. For instance, the most overt regulation of drug prices called for in the Clinton reform package was the proposal to prohibit Medicare reimbursement for new drugs deemed to be priced "too high." To the extent that the elderly are a more cohesive and powerful political faction than other drug consumers, Measure 2 could also capture a firm's incentive to influence potential regulation. 28 Measure 3 describes a firm's overtly political actions under the assumption that they proxy for its sensitivity to political pressure.
The variables we use to capture each of the three political sensitivity measures are described in contributions were through corporate PACs. We, therefore, feel that our measure captures the bulk of the political contributions.
Empirical Specification
The cross-sectional empirical results we present below can be interpreted with respect to the following semi-reduced form pricing equation:
where p ijt is the price charged by firm j for drug i during month t and mc ijt is marginal cost. 30 We want to allow political pressure in addition to market conditions to affect a firm's pricing decisions, so we will model θ ijt as a multiplicative function of the demand elasticity for drug i at time t and the political pressure faced by firm j at time t. 31 Because we do not observe marginal costs, we decompose mc ijt into a month-specific term and a drug-specific term. Taking logs and rewriting, this pricing equation becomes:
where X ijt is a vector of variables affecting the elasticity of demand for the drug and Y jt is a vector of variables measuring the political pressure faced by the firm. We make the further simplifying assumption that changes in the log of industry-wide marginal costs are linear within k different time periods (note that this also accounts for industry-wide changes in elasticity not captured by the variables in X ijt ) and that there are no systematic, drug-specific changes in costs beyond the industry trend. Then, differencing equation (2) and allowing for a random error, we get:
To estimate equation (3) we use data on the time until each drug goes off patent or the time since it was off patent and therapeutic category dummies as variables which could relate to changes in the demand elasticity (∆X ijt ). 32 We construct ∆Y jt by interacting our cross-sectional measures of firm sensitivity with dummy variables for periods over which the salience of political pressure varied. Finally, we estimate α k with period-specific dummy variables.
Our null hypothesis is that the components of γ will be equal to zero for all periods. The alternative hypothesis-roughly that political pressure will affect drug pricing-merits elaboration. First of all, during periods when political pressure is particularly salient, we expect the corresponding rows of γ to be negative, suggesting that firms that are more sensitive will have slower price increases. Since health care reform falls in the middle of our data set, we also have periods before and after the period of intense political pressure. If there is some baseline level of political pressure during the entire time period and if the companies we identify as politically 31 Note that we are modeling political pressure at the company level and not the drug level and not capturing, for instance, the fact that drugs sold to a specific class of customers (e.g., the elderly) may be subject to more political pressure.
32 Caves et al. (1991) show that prices for drugs off patent have slower inflation (especially as they face more competition from generics) and that drug prices accelerate for the several years before a patent expires. Similarly, different therapeutic categories will face different changes in market structures over time, suggesting that changes in demand elasticities may differ by therapeutic category.
sensitive restrain their price increases as a result, the components of γ may always be negative.
We would expect, however, that the coefficients during health care reform would be more negative. After health care reform, the coefficients could be positive if firms try to make up for the fact that they restrained pricing when political pressure was high, although there may be some base level of political pressure that prevents this kind of catch up.
Results
We start by examining the data set of the top 106 drugs, and Table 4 The pattern in Table 4 is consistent with the idea that staving off industry-wide regulation is a public good. We are trying to take advantage of the fact that companies' individual incentives to take costly steps to defer regulation varied, but ideally, as came close to happening While the simple differences in Table 4 are instructive, they do not control for other factors known to affect drug prices. For instance, Caves et al. (1991) show that there are persistent price and advertising reactions to imminent patent removal and recent patent loss.
Perhaps the ages of different companies' drugs relative to their patent expiration dates (the very variation Co. Patent Duration seeks to take advantage of) affects their relative price changes.
Since Co. Patent Duration is based in 1993, such an effect may be greatest then. In order to control for such possibilities, we estimated versions of equation (3) and report the results in Table 5 .
Like Table 4, Table 5 reports results based on all three measures of political sensitivity, again using just the top 106 data set. In each regression, we include period fixed effects and interact the period dummies with the political sensitivity variable listed at the head of the column. (In other words, for column 1, the coefficient reported in the Political Sens*Period1 row is based on the variable Co. Patent Duration*Period1 but in column 3 it is based on Co.
Elder Drugs*Period1.) We report two sets of results for each sensitivity measure: one including therapeutic category specific effects for each period, and one without those fixed effects. We It is difficult to use the results in Table 5 to assess how much of the aggregate price dip depicted in Figure 3 and discussed in Section 4 can be explained by political motivations. While we identify politically-motivated pricing by comparing pricing strategies of more and less sensitive companies, it is conceivable that even the least sensitive companies lowered their prices somewhat in response to the threat of regulation. With that caveat in mind, the results reported for the interaction terms for Period4 33 each suggests that a one standard deviation increase in political sensitivity is associated with roughly a two to five-hundredths of a percentage point change in monthly inflation. By comparison, the average monthly price increase fell by about three tenths of a percentage point between 1989-1991 and 1993-94 . Taking these magnitudes as lower bounds on the extent to which political motivations affected pricing decisions, they only explain ten to fifteen percent of the drop in inflation. Clearly many factors were at work (see, e.g. Ellison, 1998) of which politics is just one.
The control variables included in Table 5 are generally significant and their signs are roughly consistent with past work. For instance, the variable Time since Patent Exp. is negative suggesting that price increases slow progressively as the time since the patent expiration increases. To the extent there are more generic entrants over time, this result is consistent with Caves et al. (1991) . Similarly, the negative coefficient on Time to Patent Exp. is consistent with the positive coefficient that they find on variables measuring the time since the drug was introduced. Also, the coefficients on the period effects show the largest drops in drug price inflation in 1993 and 1994.
Co. PAC Growth is used here as a measure of political sensitivity, but the results in columns 5 and 6 also address the complementarity between overt political strategies and politically-motivated pricing decisions. The coefficients on Co. PAC Growth*Period3 and Co.
PAC Growth*Period4 could be insignificantly different from zero, for instance, if PAC contributions and pricing strategies are substitutes. For instance, if demand elasticites are very different across different companies' drugs, the same price reduction (which could have roughly 33 The numbers reported in Table 5 are the coefficients times 10 4 .
the same political impact) could have very different costs. If price changes are costly for a given firm, it could substitute into PAC contributions.
Several additional issues can be addressed by limiting the data set to antibiotic drugs, for which we have information on volume sales. We use the information on volume sales to weight price changes for different presentations by their sales. For instance, since most price pledges were vague about how increases would be weighted, it is possible that the companies increased prices for high volume presentations and decreased them for low volume. Also, by considering a specific sub-class of products, we can control for changes in demand elasticity or cost that were unique to that class.
The results we obtain for the antibiotics, reported in Table 6 , are broadly consistent with those for the top 106 drugs, albeit somewhat less strong. Co. PAC Growth is the only measure of political sensitivity that yields significant results, but those results are consistent with our findings for the top 106 drugs. Higher levels of Co. PAC Growth are associated with statistically significantly lower levels of price growth in all periods except Period3. In Period3 we cannot distinguish the effect from zero. In other words, results from the antibiotics data set support the main finding, that politically sensitive firms exhibit slower price growth around health care reform discussions, except during Period3, when collective action could be masking firm differences. In addition, the coefficients on control variables and period dummies in the antibiotics regressions are less precisely estimated than in the regressions using the top 106 drugs, but the significant ones are roughly consistent across the two data sets.
Given the very different characteristics of the two data sets, the consistency in results is striking and encouraging. It is instructive, however, to consider the differences in the two sets of results more carefully. Upon initial consideration, one might have expected more precisely estimated coefficients from the antibiotics data set, where the set of drugs was more homogeneous. For our purposes, however, what may be more important is that the antibiotics data set contains many small revenue drugs that would not have been very politically visible.
Although our analysis implicitly assumes that political sensitivity varies only by firm and not by drug within firm, it may be that firms recognize that distorting their prices on their more visible drugs is a more efficient way to deter regulation. Therefore, it may not be surprising that we obtained stronger results for the top 106 drugs, given that it is a data set comprised entirely of high revenue, politically visible drugs.
Conclusions
The results presented here suggest that there was a political component to pharmaceutical pricing during the health care reform debates, explaining approximately fifteen percent of the total reduction in price inflation observed in 1993-4. Probably the most profound recent development in the prescription pharmaceutical market is the increase in the volume of drugs sold through mail order outlets (and the concomitant fall in the percent of drugs sold through retail outlets, including pharmacies, mass merchandisers and food stores) and the increase in retail sales paid for by a third party. 34 The most often-cited explanation for slower drug price inflation in the early 1990s is the pressure that cost-conscious managed care plans are putting on pharmaceutical companies. While we cannot explicitly rule out other explanations for price reductions, and no doubt many of them were also affecting prices, they only explain our results if companies' sensitivity to the additional factors was correlated with the political sensitivity measures we are using.
Note that our results do not speak to the welfare implications of any politically motivated price reductions. It may be tempting to conclude that when firms voluntarily lower prices, efficiency increases. However, lower prices may reduce R&D below socially optimal levels, favoring current drug consumers at the cost of the future sick. To the extent politics put downward pressure on prices in 1993-4, there is little evidence that the most affected companies have subsequently tried to make up with accelerated price increases. This suggests that the reallocation of rents to current consumers has not been temporary.
34 Berndt et al. (1998) report that 57% of pharmaceutical sales took place through retail outlets in 1996 compared to 64% in 1990 while mail order sales have increased from 5% to 9% of the market (the hospital and HMO shares have remained relatively constant). Over the same time period, the percent of retail sales paid for by third parties (other than Medicaid) has risen from 28% to 57%.
The health care reform debates provide a relatively distinct shock (with exogenous boundaries) to the political pressure faced by the drug companies, and a number of steps taken by the companies suggest that they took the threat seriously. For that reason, the situation provides a weak test of political pricing. The fact that political effects seem to play a relatively minor role in explaining recent price movements may suggest that they are of limited importance. However, several factors, most notably the industry-wide push to moderate price inflation, complicate the assessment of political pricing in this context. 
APPENDIX
Following is a more detailed description of some of the data sets and variables used in this paper.
Prices
The first pricing data set, with the top 106 largest revenue drugs, was derived from the ReadyPrice database, a compendium of the information found in the annual publication and monthly supplements to the Red Book. Both ReadyPrice and the Red Book are published by Micromedix. ReadyPrice contains average wholesale prices (AWP) for a number of drugs, of which we have selected 106 to analyze in this paper. Our data set covers only those NDCs that were available in the beginning of 1997, and the pricing histories for each NDC are not consistent. Only 52 percent of the NDCs for which we have data in 1997 are covered in 1989. Information on historical pricing is unavailable because the NDC was introduced mid-way through the time period we study, or because Ready Price discontinued coverage of the NDC.
One concern with the ReadyPrice series is that it does not contain information on sales or revenue figures by NDC. We are unable to identify those NDCs that are used by many customers and those which are comparatively rare. (It is not entirely clear that we should weight more heavily drugs or dosage-forms used by more people. Dosage-forms used by more people are seen by more people, but it is not clear that this is the relevant metric of political exposure.) The difference between the standard deviation within a drug-month and between drug-months suggests that the bulk of the variation is between drug-months, though price changes are not uniform across NDCs within a drug. We report results based both on average price changes across drugs (Table 4 ) and using each NDC as a separate observation (Table 5 ).
The second pricing data set, covering antibiotics, comes in two pieces, one covering 1985 to 1991 and the second covering 1990 to 1996. The first piece, collected by IMS America, contains wholesale quantities and revenues of all prescription cephalosporins (a subclass of antibiotics) sold in the U.S. from October 1985 to December 1991. These data are monthly and come at the NDC level, but we aggregate up to the drug level by computing a Divisia price index for each drug. Figures 1 and 2 are Divisia price indexes of many drugs. See Ellison (1998) for a more comprehensive discussion both of this data set and the calculation of the Divisia indexes.
Co. Patent Duration
Co. Patent Duration measures the sales-weighted average patent life remaining on each company's drug portfolio as of 1993. Table A1 details the drugs, sales figures and patent expiration dates used to construct the variable. Finding sales information for a number of drugs for comparable markets (e.g. U.S. and not international, consistent weights on distribution outlets) is not easy. We use the annual lists of the top 100 drugs by US sales published every spring in Med Ad News. Because we want to describe a company's perspective in 1993, we use information on drug sales in 1993, 1994 and 1995, under the assumption that companies could accurately forecast drug sales for existing and new products through 1995. The three lists together cover 140 drugs. Each list contains information on the current years' sales as well as the previous years', so a number of the gaps in sales figures could be filled. For instance, when a drug showed up on the 1994 list that had not been on the 1993 list, the 1994 list almost always contained information on 1993 sales. If sales figures for a given year were still missing, we extrapolated from recent growth rates, or included zero sales for drugs brought to market after the year for which we had no data. We calculate each drug's total sales over the three-year period, though we discount 1994 and 1995 sales by factors of .9 and .8 respectively because, as of 1993, the sales were both in the future and uncertain.
The patent expiration years in Table A1 are those reported in Med Ad News or Scripps. The commercially-relevant expiration date is not always identifiable in the FDA's Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (also referred to as the Orange Book), though the expiration dates in the Orange Book coincide with the commercial sources (plus or minus two years) about 90 percent of the time. We calculate the number of years each drug has remaining on patent and then take the sales-weighted average across each company's products.
Since we only consider drugs that made the top 100 lists in 1993-1995, we do not have a complete view of each company's patent profile. The distortions this introduces, however, are most likely minimal. First, drug sales are skewed heavily towards the most popular drugs. (For instance, 1993 US sales for Zantac, the top selling drug according to Med Ad, were 70 times larger than sales for the one-hundredth largest drug.) Also, for 20 of the 23 companies in our study, the largest drug not making the Med Ad lists would comprise less than five percent of total sales. Of course, if companies have a number of small drugs that do not make the list, and if those drugs are very different from the ones on the list (in terms of remaining patent years), the political sensitivity measures are less accurate. We do not think this is the case, though, since comparing the drugs we have on our list to the drugs mentioned by companies in their annual reports and 10K's suggests we have covered the bulk of the important ones. 
Co. Elder Drugs
Co. Elder Drugs measures the percent of each company's revenue from drugs in therapeutic classes that are predominantly used by the elderly. The drugs considered for each company and the sales weights used are identical to those described above and summarized in Table A1 of the Appendix. Elderly therapeutic classes are identified from Berndt et al. (1998) who report usage patterns between the elderly and non-elderly based on information from surveys of physicians on drugs prescribed to patients of different ages. All cardiac drugs, antineoplastic agents, cholesterol reducers, antidiabetics, arthritis treatments, glaucoma treatments, antiemetics, diuretics, clot dissolvers, and one drug (Parlodel) used to treat patients with Parkinson's disease were considered elderly.
Co. PAC Growth
Co. PAC Growth measures the increase in the annual disbursements made by each company's corporate PAC between the 1991/2 election cycle and calendar year 1993. Information on PAC disbursements for the 1991/2 election cycle is from Makinson and Goldstein (1994) . The PACs of two companies, Amgen and Wyeth-Ayerst, were not covered by Makinson and Goldstein (1994) , so we used information assembled by ICPSR. Data on PAC disbursements for companies covered by both Makinson and Goldstein and ICPSR were very similar. Information on PAC disbursements for the calendar year 1993 was obtained directly from company filings with the Federal Election Committee, downloaded from the Federal Election Commission's web site (www.fec.gov). Online information only extends back to 1993. Note that Makinson and Goldstein (1994) only covers donations to Congressional candidates, so even though 1991/2 coincided with the presidential election cycle, the PAC contributions we consider are roughly comparable across time periods.
Time to/since Patent Exp.
The patent expiration years listed in Table A1 were also used to construct the last two variables in Table 1 , Time to Patent Expiration and Time since Patent Expiration. The first variable is equal to zero in years after a drug's patent has expired and equal to the number of years until the patent expires for drugs that are still on patent. The second variable is equal to zero for drugs that still have patent coverage and equal to the number of years since the patent expired for off-patent drugs. Due to the different regulatory treatment of antibiotics, patent expirations are not available from the same sources. For the second data set, therefore, we simply use the year in which generics entered as the year of commercially-relevant patent expiration. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Price/Index Change (Percent) 
